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The traditional argument that shorter product cycles favor trade secrets over
patenting is based on the presumption that copying becomes less protable
and trade secrets less likely to be discovered when a technology can be used
for a shortened time period only. I review this argument. Under certain
circumstances shorter product cycles can generate incentives to apply for
more patents and the consequence may be the emergence of a patent thicket.
In the model the underlying mechanism for the more intensive patenting
activity is that one rm may start to raise its number of patent applications
for exogenous reasons and the optimal reaction of other rms is then to match
this behavior. Otherwise, the extensive patenting of one rm would drive the
other rms out of the market or cut their prots signicantly. In order to
prevent this, the other rms start ling patent applications on many ideas,
which are not mature yet but may turn out successful eventually, instead
of few fully developed technologies. If this situation occurs the rms may
end up in a prisoners' dilemma where they would jointly prefer the situation
where all rms innovate at moderate pace but each individual rm has an
incentive to deviate to a short cycle with intensive patenting.
Further, network eects may reinforce a rm's incentive to accelerate
her R&D process and to induce other rms to adopt this strategy. Network
eects make it more attractive to gain market shares at an early stage because
an advance compared to the competitors will be persistent. Therefore, the
model predicts an intensive race by means of patent applications followed by a
period of attenuated innovative activities. Similarly, blocking patents provide
an advantage over competitors by limiting their access to technologies. But,
in contrast to network eects, this is socially harmful because some R&D
eort is wasted. Therefore, rms will patent less because their R&D tends
to be less ecient.
Licensing is an appropriate remedy to blocking patents and patent thick-
ets and policy should facilitate licensing agreements in order to benet from
technologies that would otherwise lie idle.Zusammenfassung
Das Argument, k urzere Produktlebenszyklen w urden zu einem verst arkten
Einsatz von Geheimhaltung statt Patentierens f uhren, basiert auf dem Ef-
fekt, dass Nachahmen weniger lohnend und Geheimhaltung eektiver werden.
Die  Uberpr ufung dieses Arguments zeigt, dass unter bestimmten Bedingun-
gen der gegenteilige Eekt eintreten kann. Verk urzte Produktlebenszyklen
k onnen dazu f uhren, dass vermehrt Patentanmeldungen eingereicht werden.
In der Folge ist es wahrscheinlicher, dass Patentdickichte entstehen.
Im Modell bewirkt das verst arkte Patentieren durch ein Unternehmen,
dass andere Unternehmen gezwungen werden, dieses Verhalten nachzuahmen.
Andernfalls w urden sie den Zugri auf neue Technologien verlieren oder zu-
mindest starke Gewinneinbuen erleiden. Um dies zu verhindern, beginnen
auch die anderen Unternehmen zahlreiche, noch nicht ausgereifte Ideen, die
sich erst sp ater als erfolgreich herausstellen k onnen, zum Patent anzumelden,
statt nur wenige, ausgereifte Technologien anzumelden. Wenn diese Situation
eintritt, benden sich die Unternehmen in einem Gefangenendilemma: Jedes
von ihnen bevorzugt die Situation, in der alle moderat patentieren. Wenn
alle Unternehmen diese Strategie verfolgen hat jedes Unternehmen einen in-
dividuellen Anreiz doch wieder verst arkt zu patentieren.
Das Vorliegen von Netzwerkeekten verst arkt den Anreiz f ur jedes Un-
ternehmen seine F&E-Intensit at zu erh ohen. Dieser Eekt bewirkt, dass es
f ur Unternehmen besonders protabel ist, fr uhzeitig Marktanteile zu erlan-
gen, weil sein gr oerer Marktanteil ein Unternehmen besonders attraktiv f ur
neue Kunden macht. Deshalb sagt das Modell f ur solche Industrien einen
anfangs verst arkten, sp ater nachlassenden Technologiewettbewerb voraus.
In gleicher Weise bewirken blockierende Patente, dass ihre Inhaber einen
Vorteil gegen uber Wettbewerbern erlangen. Dies sind Patente, die f ur eine
bestimmte Technologie essenziell sind. Im Gegensatz zu Netzwerkeekten
beruht die Wirkung von blockierenden Patenten darauf, dass F&E Aufwen-
dungen obsolet werden. Daher reduziert sich der Anreiz von Unternehmen
zu patentieren, weil F&E-Investitionen weniger produktiv werden.
Lizenzen sind ein wirksames Instrument, um Patentdickichte und die
blockierende Wirkung von Patenten aufzul osen. Solche Vereinbarungen zwis-
chen Unternehmen sollten vereinfacht werden, damit Technologien, die nur
aufgrund von Patentdickichten brach liegen, eingesetzt werden k onnen.Do shorter product cycles induce patent
thickets?
Patrick F.E. Beschorner
rst draft: September 2008
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Abstract
The traditional argument that shorter product cycles favor trade
secret over patenting is reviewed. A game theoretic model provides
an argument that shorter product cycles can induce rms to le more
patent applications. The rms may be trapped in a prisoners' dilemma
where all rms would jointly prefer to patent less and to not have a
patent thicket. If rms start applying for patents on technologies
which are not yet mature in order to cover ideas that may eventually
turn successful, this may create a patent thicket. The transition into
a situation where rms start patenting many ideas instead of single
mature technologies is initiated and accelerated when network eects
are present or patents exhibit a blocking property.
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1 Introduction
Where does the patent thicket come from? Some industries tend to produce
patent applications which result in overlapping property rights, for example
the ICT sector, biotechnologies or the software industry.1 Using one's own
patents may inevitably infringe upon other parties' patents. Thus, patents
can be used in order to block others from exploiting their patents or hin-
der them to develop competing products based on their own patents.2 In
less severe cases the fragmentation of intellectual property rights leads to a
cost rise for developing marketable products. Overall, this may result in an
disincentive for innovation.3
There are several explanations for the emergence of patent thickets4 and
the so-called patent surge or patent explosion5. The present paper conjectures
that a shorter product cycle can induce a higher propensity to patent. This
contrasts with the intuition that a shorter time for recouping the investment
for a technology renders secrecy more attractive than patenting, thus the
shortening of product cycles is contented to reduce the propensity to patent.
Sabety (2004) provides an exemplary comparison of the information tech-
nology industry, where software was originally considered not patetentable
subject mater, whereas in nanotechnology patentability has never been ques-
tioned. In both industries patent thickets are emerging and this hampers
or delays further innovation, but nanotechnology is a comparatively juve-
nile industry. In order to allow this industry to live a long period of jaunty
development as did the software industry before, he recommends to adopt
a similar IP schedule where the strength of IP protection should raise with
1See Shapiro (2001), Sabety (2004).
2See Heller and Eisenberg (1998).
3See Merges and Nelson (1990).
4A detailed discussion is provided for example by Shapiro (2001).
5See Kortum and Lerner (1998) or Sanyal and Jaee (2007).3
maturity of the industry in order to avoid blocking situations in the early
stage.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next subsections
will provide reference to related work and present the intuition for the model
setting. Section 2 sets up the model, which is discussed in section 3. Section
4 provides extensions on network eects, blocking patents, and licensing.
Section 5 concludes.
1.1 Related Work
There is a strand of literature on sequential improvements of products. A
detailed discussion of IP policy in the context of quality ladders is provided
by Scotchmer (2004). The rm strategies on sequential innovations and the
aicting factors on the decision to introduce incremental innovations or fron-
tier innovations are analyzed by Gjerde et al. (2002).
Another strand of literature on product cycles and international trade
is based on heterogeneous rms. Models with a high ability to innovate in
the North region face imitators or a less productive South region. Based
on this idea by Vernon (1966) several renements of this model conrm the
robustness of his result that the rm (country) endowed with a technologi-
cal advance keeps this advantage. Segerstrom et al. (1990) nd that trade
taris that protect from the imitating country's lower labor cost reduce over-
all the innovative activity in an economy. Similarly, extending the present
model by blocking patents results in the eect that R&D activities become
less productive and, thus, less attractive to rms. Grossman and Helpman
(1991) analyze heterogenous countries in a general equilibrium model. The
countries dier in their ability to innovate and they can imitate or innovate
and this determines endogenously the product cycle. They study how the4
sizes of the two regions and the levels of support or subsidies for R&D aect
the long-run rates of innovation and imitation and, nally, how this aicts
the length of the average product cycle. I will adopt from their setting that
the innovator earns the monopoly payo and that the R&D decision is to be
taken repeatedly. However, in contrast to their model with asymmetric coun-
tries, I focus on symmetric rms because this paper aims at analyzing the
patenting strategies of rms on a level playing eld. This is a presumption in
part of the literature on endogenous growth, e.g. Aghion and Howitt (1992),
where the research question aims at an optimal policy for aggregate produc-
tion or knowledge growth. However, I consider the interaction among R&D
conducting rms whereas that strand of literature stylizes this interaction as
spillovers.
The timing of introducing new products with consideration of the trade-
o between time to market, resources spent, and the degree of novelty has
been inter alia analyzed by Reinganum (1989), Fudenberg and Tirole (1984),
Tirole (1990) and Hendricks (1992). Similarly, concentrating on the adoption
of single innovations, the present model builds on these insights and focuses
on the use of patent applications as an instrument to pursue these strategies.
A model allowing for incremental innovations as well as frontier innovations
is provided by Gjerde et al. (2002).
1.2 The Story
I analyze the rms' incentive to patent as a reaction to their competitors'
patenting strategies. Thereby, patenting is an instrument to support an
accelerated R&D process and to induce a shortening of product life cycles.
Products are regularly modied and updated to meet the current con-
sumers' expectations, regulatory norms, or state of the art. In the automobil5
industry model years show up minor modications up to a change in the
model cycle where a new body or a new series of engines is built in. Similarly,
computers, i.e. the CPU, have shown a typical evolvement in performance
and the generations of CPU have been named i86 and Pentium, Pentium2,
Pentium3, ...6 Further, we observe that product life cycles tend to become
shorter.7 One reason in the automotive sector is that the design is done with
more advanced software and many time-consuming processes were replaced
or accelerated by use of computers. Other reasons are that both the produc-
tion and development processes have been reorganized, such that the role of
IP became more important.8 Whimsical observers of the market proclaim
that the test phase for new vehicles has been shifted to the early buyers,
leading to a surge in lemon cars.
In the present analysis, I focus on products where patent protection is
immanent. This means that any innovation is patented because it may be
too easy to copy, e.g. by reverse engineering. Thus, I do not focus on the
trade-o between secrecy and protection. This would attack on a distinct
branch of literature which has been analyzed to a broad extent (See Cohen,
Nelson, and Walsh (2000), Gallini (2002)).
As in Ofek and Savary (2004), I model a very stylized demand behavior
of the consumers who strictly prefer a new generation product as soon as
this becomes available. A rm that oers a predecessor model will make no
sales. This extreme demand structure is primarily helpful for the handling
of the model structure. In fact, there exists evidence that rms have to oer
extensive discounts to sell new products stemming from an outdated product
life cycle. In the automotive industry passed year models are sold with high
6See Ofek and Sarvary (2003).
7See Agarwal and Gort (2001).
8See Teece et al. (1997), Pisano and Teece (2007).6
rebates as soon as the next model year becomes available.9 This stylized
distribution of demand can be derived from individual utility maximizing
behavior, e.g. in Shaked and Sutton (1982) or Mussa and Rosen (1978)
where ex ante symmetric rms oer vertically dierentiated products. Each
rm prefers to oer the higher quality product and these two models do not
explain which rms takes which role.
For the R&D process I assume that rms have a number of ideas on how
to develop a technology and that nding the appropriate technology is a
time-consuming process. At the patenting stage, a rm may not yet know
which of its ideas will turn out to be valuable and will lead to a marketable
product. Thus, nally one out of many ideas turns out to be the basis of a
new technology and will be developed, which then will be patented. Real-
izing these steps one by one will take time that delays the marketing of the
new product. However, each of these steps is essential and cannot be circum-
vented. But the process can be accelerated if a rm is applying for patents
on many promising technologies before she nds out which actually is the
successful technology. Thus, more than the successful idea is patented. This
strategy allows to protect potentially tractable technologies before the nal
decision is taken on which one is to be carried out up to the nal product.
Advocates of patent continuations contend that dening an invention is a
complex process and it may become necessary to amend the scope of protec-
tion that is claimed in the original application. This practice is common at
the USPTO but continuing patent applications are not admissible the EPO.
Still, rms can le many applications.10
I will distinguish a long and a short R&D schedule L and S, respectively.
In the long schedule the rms rst develop an idea into a technology, which
is patented subsequently. In contrast in the short schedule several ideas are
9See Langer and Miller (2008).
10See Katznelson (2007).7
patented before the successful idea has been identied. Thus, the nal tech-
nology is based on a patented idea and the protection of other ideas becomes
obsolete even though these ideas eventually are granted patent protection.
These patents together with countless pending patent applications may over
time create a patent thicket with overlapping intellectual property rights and
create uncertainty.11 Sometimes continuations with amended sham claims
are led in order to cover a competitor's product.12 This procedure is not
covered by the Patent Examining Procudure, although it can occur.13
In our model each of the two schedules will have pros and cons. Basically,
the short cycle oers the chance to market a new product cycle earlier than
under the long cycle. However, there is a higher cost because more patent
applications are led. Also R&D may be conducted more intensively or the
search of prior art must be conducted more accurately because this informa-
tion must be available earlier than the accomplishment of the patent search
report. In contrast, the long cycle has fewer costs and upon completion the
R&D process provides a certain success, i.e. the rm will dispose of a viable
technology.
R&D is an ongoing process. This means that within a product life cycle,
the R&D process for the next generation product may already start. In our
model I may have an overlap of product cycles in the sense that one product
is in the R&D stage while the previous generation is on the market. Further,
as R&D is uncertain, for a certain period it may be not clear which product
is marketed. If the R&D process is successful, the new generation will be
oered, otherwise it is the old product. In case that a rm has applied for
patents on many technology ideas before having developed them to a mature
11See Blonder (2005).
12See Katznelson (2007).
13See x201.07, Manual of Patent Examining Procedures, USPTO, (August 2006), at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/oces/pac/mpep/mpep.htm.8
technology, it can be lucky and be able to transform one of them into a
product that is sold immediately. Then, the competitor is no more able to
sell her product, unless she can also oer a new generation product.
2 The Model
In this section I present the basic model which is solved by backwards induc-
tion. This model will be extended in the subsequent section.
Assume that in a long R&D process the nal product is marketed in the
period following the R&D stage. This means that in the long R&D process
the rm will have a product in the second period for sure but none during the
R&D stage. In the rst stage R&D is conducted and in the second period and
possibly in the third period the product is marketed. In this example stage
two is a pure marketing stage whereas stage three consists of both selling the
product and conducting R&D for the next generation product. Thus, a cycle
lasts for two periods until R&D is conducted anew. I denote this strategy of
rm i by L2
i where the superscript denotes the number of periods until R&D
starts anew. I normalize the cost of this long R&D process to zero.
A rm can choose the length of its product cycle, i.e. when it starts the
R&D process anew. A short R&D process aims at introducing a new product
in the same period in which the R&D is conducted. Being successful the new
product is marketed in the rst stage, otherwise in the second. If a rm
conducts R&D in each period and aims at oering a new generation product
in each period, this cycle lasts only one period. The costs of the short R&D
strategy is proportional to the number of patent applications N(p) where p
is the probability that the rm will have a successful technology in the R&D
period. Such a short R&D strategy combined with a short cycle by rm i is
denoted S1
i .9
The payos will depend on the strategy choices of the two rms. In order
to take into account time, I discount with the factor 0 <  < 1 per period.
By assumption, all periods are of identical length. The simplest case arises
when the rms choose symmetric strategies. If both rms choose L2
i, this















Basically, both rms oer identical products which are updated every other
period. Consequently, they earn duopoly prot D in every period.
Similarly, if both rms apply strategy S1
i they have identical expectations
about each future period. However, as the R&D processes are uncertain, the
payos will depend on the R&D outcomes. Either both rms, one, or none
of them may be successful. If only one of the rms is successful we have the
asymmetric case where the innovator will earn monopoly prots because by
assumption only his product will meet demand like in Grossman and Helpman
(1991). In the symmetric case, both rms choose the same strategy.
The success probability of a rm will depend on the number of its patent
applications. Let pi denote the success probability of rm i in the R&D stage.
Then N(pi) is the number of patent applications that are necessary in order
to realize this probability. N can be interpreted as the cost of patenting if
the cost of one patent application is normalized to one. In order to guarantee
that pi 2 [0;1], I assume N being convex, N(0) = 0, limp!1 N(p) = 1. If
the rms do not apply the short R&D cycle or they are not successful in the
short cycle, I assume that the rms obtain the relevant technology for sure
in the subsequent period at zero cost. This normalization will simplify the10
further computations. The expected payo for rm 1 will be
S
1
1 =  N(p1) + p1(1   p2)








 N(p1) + p1(1   p2)M + (1   p1)(1   p2)D + p1p2D
1   
: (2)
p1(1   p2) is the probability of the case where rm 1 is successful, but rm
2 is not. In the opposite case, rm 1 earns zero prot. (1   p1)(1   p2) is
the probability that both rms take their augmented eort in vain. Still they
earn duopoly prots because in the period after the previous R&D stage both
are certain to have a (pre-generation) product and earn duopoly prot. p1p2
is the probability that both rms successfully introduce a new product. For
simplicity reasons I assume that the duopoly prot is the same as with the
old product.
In the case that the rms have asymmetric strategies, I need further as-
sumptions. Departing from an L2
1;2 situation, assume that rm 1 chooses to
switch to an S1 strategy. If it nds it protable in one period, it will be prof-
itable in the next period, too, given that the competitor is still following an
L2
2 strategy. Thus, rm 1 would shorten his product cycle and the only sen-
sible strategy would be S1
1. Consequently, I need to consider an appropriate
reaction of rm 2. If for rm 2 sticking to the L2
2 strategy is still protable,
then she continues to have zero R&D costs but she yields a positive revenue
only with probability 1   p1, when rm 1 is not successful. However, after
having faced her competitor shortening his R&D process rm 2 can switch to
an S2 strategy, too. For the same argument as above, if switching once to an
S2 strategy, when rm 1 follows an S1
1 strategy, is protable, it will be so in
the next period, too, such that rm 2 would choose S2
2. Summing up, either
rm 2 reacts by adopting the same strategy as rm 1 or she does not change
her behavior. Now, I can formulate the two payos. Let rm 1 choose S1
111
while rm 2 sticks to the long research cycle with L1





2) =  N(p1) + p1
M + (1   p1)
D: (3)





1) = (1   p1)
D: (4)
i = 2











Table 1: Payo matrix
In the following I will use the notation i(x1;x2) for rm i's strategy with
xi 2 fL;Sg denoting i's strategy.
2.1 Equilibria in the static game
This subsection covers the strategy choice of the rms with respect to the
length of the cycles. Depending on the magnitude of the payos, all combi-
nations of actions can form an equilibrium.
It is not clear whether an S strategy is protable overall. But, comparing
the payos immediately shows that being the only rm to follow an S strategy
is more protable than if both rms do so. We can immediately see that
 N(p1) + p1(1   p2)





M + (1   p1)
D   p1p2(
M   




 N(e p1) + e p1
M + (1   e p1)
D > 
D (5)
where N(p1) and N(e p1) denote the number of patent applications in the sym-
metric S;S and asymmetric S;L strategy choice, respectively. This means
that if it is more protable for both rms to choose the short cycle than both
sticking to the long cycle, then each rm would prefer to be the only rm
with the short cycle while the other stays with the long cycle.
However, whether an S strategy is protable overall, depends on the
parameters, namely the success probabilities, the monopoly and duopoly
payos, and the cost of R&D. It is obvious that high costs of research or
low monopoly payos will result in an L;L equilibrium. Conversely, if the
prospective monopoly prot is high compared to the R&D costs, then both
rms may be willing to take a chance and both choose the short cycle S.
Lemma 1 A rm unilaterally choosing the short cycle S applies for more
patents than in the symmetric case where both rms choose S: N(e p1) >
N(p1).
Proof Firm 1's payo and the rst order condition for S;L are
 N(e p1) + e p1
M + (1   e p1)
D (6)
N
0(e p1) = 
M   
D: (7)
In the symmetric case S;S the payo and the rst order conditions are
 N(p1) + p1(1   p2)








M   2D > 0 because a monopolist can replicate two duopolists. Because
of symmetry the arguments hold for rm 2, too. Thus, N(e pi) > N(pi) for
i = 1;2. 2
The more interesting cases arise when 1(S;L) > 1(L;L) and 1(L;L) >
1(S;S) > 0 and the same holds for rm 2. This means that both rms pre-
fer to be the only rm employing the S strategy but they are worse-o than
under the L;L strategy if both choose S. This is a prisoners' dilemma. Given
the L;L situation each rm has an incentive to unilaterally switch to S, but
they will end up in the S;S case. S;S is a Nash-equilibrium with none of the
rms having an incentive to unilaterally switch to the L strategy. Formally,
the prisoners' dilemma arises if
1(S;L) > 1(L;L) (10)
1(L;L) > 1(S;S) (11)
1(S;S) > 1(L;S) (12)
and the analogous conditions hold for i = 2. I can show
Lemma 2 Given that the rms are symmetric and that (p;p) is the sym-
metric Nash equilibrium for (i 2 f1;2g;Ni 2 [0;1[;(Ni;N i)). Then a













where p1 = p2  p because of symmetry.
Proof We show that (10) through (12) is met. Because of symmetry it is
sucient to show that the conditions hold for one rm.14
(11) holds if

D >  N(p1) + p1(1   p2)
M + [(1   p1)(1   p2) + p1p2]
D (14)
Using the symmetry p1 = p2  p results in




which constitutes the lower bound in (13).
(10) holds for
 N(e p1) + e p1
M + (1   e p1)
D > 
D (16)
which is equivalent to
N(e p1) < e p1(
M   
D): (17)
Applying the symmetry condition to (12)
 N(p1) + p1(1   p2)
M + (1   p)
D + p1p2
D > (1   p2)
D (18)
yields






Note that rm 1 faces p2 if he unilaterally chooses N(p1) because rm 2
would still expect to be in the S;S situation.15
Now I show that (19) implies (17). Insert e p1 = p in (17)
LHS  N(p) < p(
M   
D)  RHS (20)







(20) implies (21). For e p1 > p the incremental change in (20) is
Z e p1
p
N(x)dx < (e p1   p)(
M   
D) (22)
and the inequality holds because of (7) and convexity of N. Because (17) is
weaker condition than (19) for e p1 = p and (17) is further weakened for e p1 > p
conditions (15) and (19) dene lemma (2). 2
Existence of an Equilibrium
Note that an equilibrium (p;p) where p > 0 not necessarily exists. Since we
add no additional restriction on N() except strict convexity, it is possible
that N0(0) > 0 exceeds the expected revenue from the rst patent and thus,
rms choose not to patent, N = 0.
2.2 Equilibria in the dynamic game
Lemma 2 holds for a one-shot game with the payo matrix given by Table
1. In a dynamic setting where the game is repeated perpetually, I need
further assumptions on the rms' expectations. Unless otherwise stated, I will16
assume that rms expect that their competitor is sticking to his/her strategy
unless they have a unilateral incentive to change. For a prisoners' dilemma
the rms must be better-o under L;L than under S;S, thus condition (11)
must hold. Further, departing from L;L each rm has an incentive to choose
S, and departing from S;L (L;S) rm 2 (1) has an incentive to match S. In
the dynamic game the rms anticipate that unilaterally deviating from L;L
will result in S;L for one period and S;S for all future periods because none
of he rms will have an incentive to return to L unilaterally. When deviating
from L;L a rm will have to value a short term benet of 1(S;L) followed
by an eternal ow of 1(S;S) compared with a permanent prot 1(L;L).













Lemma 3 There exists  such that a rm chooses S for  <  and L other-
wise.
Proof From the assumption (S;L) > (L;L) > (S;S) > (L;S) > 0
follows immediately 0 <  < 1. 2
The prisoners' dilemma can arise for  <  and the situation converges to
the static setting for  ! 0.17
2.3 Unilateral enforcement
In this section, I analyze a rm's incentive to commit to a certain level of
patent applications in order to deter other rms from deviating from the L;L
situation. In the previous sections, I have considered Nash equilibria only. If
a prisoners' dilemma arises, both rms prefer L;L to S;S but no rm has an
incentive to unilaterally switch to L. Further, in an L;L situation, each of
the rms would have an incentive to switch to S. Now, I discuss the strategy
of a rm which can commit to a certain level of patent applications. For
simplicity, I assume that rm 2 can commit to p2 in a credible way and rm
1 will observe and react upon p2. The same arguments hold for rm 1 in an
analogous way. Given the situation L;L I analyze whether rm 2 is capable
and has an incentive to choose another number of patent applications than in
the Nash Equilibrium. In this scenario, rst rm 2 sets p2 and, subsequently,
rm 1 chooses L or S and p1.
In the situation with the prisoner's dilemma
(S;L) > (L;L) > (S;S) > (L;S)
holds true. In order to prevent rm 1's deviating from L;L the rst inequality
must be inverted such that
(S;L)  (L;L):
Clearly, in the static setting where the game ends after one period, there is
no way to prevent the prisoners' dilemma. A commitment to p2 consists of
rm s's commitment to set p2 in the S;S situation which would occur once
one rm chooses S. If the game ends after the rst period or  = 0 the threat
of setting p2 in a subsequent period is ineective.18
I can show for the dynamic game
Lemma 4 There exists (p2) < 1 such that a rm with  > (p2) stays with
the long research cycle L. Further, for  2 [;] rm 2 can enforce L;L by
setting p2 2 [p
2;1],
where  is dened in (24) and
 =
 N(e p1) + p1(M   D)
 N(e p1) + p1(M   D) + N(p1) + (1   p1)D = (p2 = 1):
Proof Firm 2 does not choose S if
 N(e p1) + e p1






 N(p1) + p1(1   p2)










 N(e p1) + p1(M   D)
 N(e p1) + e p1M + (1   p1)D   ( N(p1) + p1(1   p2)M + ((1   p1)(1   p2) + p1p2)D)
 (p2):
If p







and inserting p2 = 1 yields
 N(e p1) + p1(M   D)
 N(e p1)(M   D) + N(p1) + (1   p1)D   (26)19
which proves the lemma. 2
Note that p1 is a function of p2 because it is the best response of rm 1
with respect to p2. This lemma does not state that rm 2 can always enforce
an L;L equilibrium. For  < (1) this will not be possible and the lower is
, the more patents rm 2 must apply for and, thus, the higher the cost that
she must incur in order to ensure the L;L outcome.
p2 = 1 provides the least incentive for rm 1 to choose S because he
would never obtain the monopoly prot after the rst period. However, this
implies N(p2) = 1. Thus, rm 2 is only willing to deter if it can do so with
fewer patent applications and a lower probability p2 < 1.
The deterministic interpretation requires that both rms have common
knowledge about the parameters. If rm 2 has only information about the
distribution of rm 1's parameters, she can form expectations about the
eect of her number of patent applications on the probability of deterring
rm 1. Then the marginal cost of an increase in rm 2's success probability
must be compared to the marginal benet from a reduced probability of rm
1 choosing S. This interpretation is valid under the assumption that the
commitment to a constant number of patent applications N(p2) over time
is binding. Clearly, after realizing that N(p2) is not high enough to deter 1
from S rm 2 may want to revise its decision. This would imply an updating
of rm 2's priors on 1.
The scenario for deterring bilateral intensive R&D relies on the assump-
tion that rm 2 can commit to more intensive R&D by herself as a retaliation
strategy. The deterrence stage does not occur and no additional eort be-
comes necessary and no additional cost is incurred by rm 2. Thus, a credible
commitment may be hard to realize.20
In the case, when the rms are already stuck in the prisoners' dilemma
S;S, they would prefer to return to the L;L situation because this is more
benecial to both of them. We demonstrate that there is no 0 < p2  1 such
that rm 1 prefers L to S in the one shot static game.
Lemma 5 In the one shot game or  = 0 rm 2 cannot commit to a level
p2 such that rm 1 prefers to choose L instead of S in the Nash equilibrium
S;S.
Proof The asserted incentive is dened by
LHS 
(1   p2)
D >  N(p1) + p1(1   p2)
M + [(1   p1)(1   p2) + p1p2]
D
 RHS:
For p2 = 0 I have (L;L)  D <  N(p1) + p1M + (1   p1)D = (S;L)
which holds by assumption in the prisoners' dilemma because i = 1 sets
p1 = pL












where I apply the envelope theorem to RHS (p1(p2);p2), imply LHS <
RHS 8 p2. Thus, for p2 2 [0;1] the assertion cannot hold. 2
In the dynamic setting, rm 2 can generate an incentive for rm 1 to
switch and stick to strategy L by the appropriate threat of setting N(p2).
The transition from S;S to L;L requires a commitment by rm 2. If this
commitment is credible it becomes eective immediately and Lemma (4) is21
relevant.
3 Discussion
This basic model shows that several situations may occur depending on the
specics of the market. If patenting costs are high or if rms can react only
slowly such that remote periods are signicantly discounted, rms tend to
stick to the long R&D cycle. This is in line with the observation in the
automobile industry where before the introduction of computerized devel-
opment, like computer aided design or crash test simulations, model cycles
were longer than they are nowadays. By now, none of the major producers
of automobiles did abstain from this technological progress.
Once the rms have adopted the higher patenting rate and shorter prod-
uct cycles, they have no unilateral incentive to adopt the longer product cy-
cle. This eect is not driven by demand because we neglect putative changes
in customer preferences. Rather the high patenting frequency of a rm's
competitor would drive her out of the market if she does not mimic the S
strategy.
Further, I have identied unilateral strategies that enforce a long cycle
strategy. Such a strategy is only possible in a repeated setting where a com-
mitment mechanism is available. This reects the situation in typical product
markets like, inter alia, automobile, household appliances, or computers. The
static model is a reference case, but it can serve to understand emerging mar-
kets. In the software industry programming is realized in 24-hour-working
days.14 Test versions and beta versions are launched in order to shorten the
development time until marketing of new products. Here, rms face poten-
14See Kobitzsch et al. 2001.22
tial competition from innovators with similar products which are not yet in
the market. Signicant network eects, which are driven by consumer pref-
erences, provide an incentive to introduce new products as early as possible
because any lag behind a competitor may be fatal.
In the reference case all rms are identical. In the extension where one
rm can commit to a particular number of patent applications I give up the
symmetry assumption. This can refer to a case where a rm is acquired
by another company with a more rigorous patenting strategy. We observe
that some rms are very active in patenting where others are not. Texas
Instruments, Lucent or IBM for example apply for many more patents than
rms in the same product market and they are more brisk in defending their
patent rights in litigation (Thomas (2001)).
The prisoners' dilemma is one potential Nash equilibrium. It can occur
for some parameter ranges and I provided arguments that in some example
industries this equilibrium may not have occurred if none of the active rms




Network eects are driven by market demand because the consumers' utility
increases increases with the number of consumers of the same product. Katz
and Shapiro (1985) show in a one-period strategic game that the consumers'
expectations about which product will be dominant can determine which
product actually will be successful. In the context of innitely many discrete
periods Ofek and Sarvary (2003) introduce an exogenous reputation eect23
which is not based on the technology or the R&D productivity and that
gives the incumbent rm an advantage over its competitors. The reputation
advantage has similar eect as the network eect as I model it here because an
incumbent benets from being active on the market before the competitors.
In their model, an intermediate or high reputation eect raises the success
probability in the subsequent period. This reduces the R&D investment
productivity and thus the incumbent rm spends less eort the the greater
the reputation advantage. Similarly, Dasgupta (1986) shows that success in
R&D leads to a higher success rate in subsequent periods. The present model
comprises this "success breeds success"eect in the sense that both rms may
be successful in the R&D activities, but having had success in the previous
period gives that rm an additional advantage.
I modify the basic model in order to cover this eect. Assume that the
rms have identical products but one has launched her product before the
other. Then the rst product will face more demand because consumers ex-
pect that other consumers choose this product, too. For simplicity, I assume
that the earlier product continues to earn monopoly prot when rms oer
identical products. This is the case if rm i was successful in time t   1
and the other was not, and in time t both rms have no success in the R&D
activities and they are forced to cell their old products. This means that
when both rms are not successful in their R&D they will continue to earn
the same prot as they did in the previous period. If at least one rm is
successful the payos remain the same as in the reference model: If exactly
one of the rms is successful it will earn monopoly prot and if both are
successful both earn duopoly prot.
These changes require a modication of the payo structure because the
payo in one period depends on the success or failure in the previous period.24








and I can show
Lemma 6 (i) Compared to the reference model, the presence of network ef-
fects raises the number of patent applications in the rst short R&D cycle.
(ii) The number of patent applications tends to fall in subsequent periods
when all rms opt for the short R&D cycle. (iii) When both rms opt for the
short R&D cycle the incentive to patent is higher than absent network eects
if rms earn duopoly prots in the preceding period.
Proof We change notation in for this subsection such that the superscript
t denotes the time period where 0 is the stage in which rm 1 may switch to














































































































The rst order condition with respect to p0













We immediately see that p0
1 exceeds p1 in the rst order condition absent
network eects N0(p1) = M   D. This proves part (i).
In the periods t  1 the rms' incentive to apply for patents depends on
the outcome of the previous period. Since both rms apply the short R&D
cycle, patenting becomes less productive for rm 1 in expectations because
if rm 2 is successful, rm 1 earns duopoly prot at best. The presence of
a patenting competitor reduces the incentive to apply for patents after the
rst period (ii).
If a rm earns duopoly prot in a period t 1 the marginal revenue from
patenting is equal to the incentive absent network eects plus the expected
payo in t + 1. Thus the incentive is higher than absent the network eects
(iii). If a rm earns monopoly prot in a period t 1 the marginal revenue in
t from patenting is lower than the incentive absent network eects because
if both rms are not successful, this rm still earns monopoly prot. This
diminished incentive may be compensated by the incentive to obtain an ex-
pected payo in t + 1 but which eect dominates is not clear. 2
For each rm there are three dierent states: monopoly, duopoly, or zero
prot. Therefore, the exact incentive for a rm to patent depends on the
outcome of the previous period. This will determine the incentive to patent
in the current period because it is sensible to assume that rms observe
each other's number of patent applications prior to choose their own action.
Further, it remains unclear whether in the long run, more patents are led
under the presence of network eects than without but there is an intuitive
argument in favor of a higher level of patenting: Network eects render the
monopoly position more attractive because this position may be preserved
throughout the following period. While the monopolist has a lower incen-26
tive to patent because of the Arrow-eect,15 the competitor has an increased
incentive to avoid the zero prot situation in the subsequent period. Thus,
monopoly prot tends to occur more often when network eects are present
because even with two successful rms only the one with success in the pre-
vious period will earn monopoly prots. Since M > 2D the market value
is raised and this overall raises the incentive to compete for the market by
investing more in R&D and applying for more patents.
Besides the eect on the patent propensity, we observe similar eects to
the innovative advantage and the reputation advantage in Ofek and Sarvary
(2003). In their model the reputation eect decreases the rms' incentive to
invest in R&D. The substitution eect reduces the incumbent's incentive to
innovate. But the higher R&D productivity may still result in a higher R&D
eort, unless the innovative advantage becomes so important such that the
laggard cannot catch up and this would mitigate the leaders R&D incentive.
Similarly, the network eect in the present model leads to the eect that the
technology leader has less incentive to invest.
4.2 Blocking Patents
Blocking patents are one aspect of patent thickets. Letting aside uncertainty
and the holdup problem, I focus on the patent thicket as an overlapping
set of patent rights. In order to commercialize a product a company must
disentangle a web of intellectual property rights; this situation can cause the
detrimental eect of discouraging innovation.16 The existence of overlapping
intellectual property rights results in an inevitable infringement of external
patents when fully taking advantage of the own patent's scope. Avoiding
litigations or a holdup requires that the own patent cannot be exploited to
15See Tirole(1988).
16See Shapiro (2001).27
the entire extent. Therefore, some patents my lie idle after a rm has invested
R&D eort for this patent.
We introduce this eect in our model by awarding each patent a supple-
mental blocking eect on the competitor's patents. Again, I will concentrate
on the incentives for one rm, understanding that the eects for the other is
symmetric. Patent applications N(pi) by rm i will block patents by rm j
with probability pi where  2 [0;1]. This means that j's success probability
is reduced by the factor pi and only the share (1   pi)pj is the eective
success probability of rm 2.
The cases L;L and S;L remain unaltered compared to the reference model
because rm 2 has no patent applications which, by assumption, may interfere
with rm 1's patent applications.
no blocking (A) i = 1 blocking (B) i = 1;2 blocking (C)
probability payo probability payo probability payo
(a) p1(1   p2) M p2 D
(1   p2) M
(b) (1   p1)(1   p2) D
(c1) p1p2 D p1 M p2 D
(1   p2 M
(c2) (1   p1) D (1   )p2 D
p2 0
(d) (1   p1)p2 0 p1 D
(1   p1) 0
Table 2: Payo for i = 1 with Blocking Patents
Table 2 shows for the S;S situation the payos and the respective prob-
abilities of rm 1 absent blocking patents L;L, only 1 blocking S;L, and
1 and 2 blocking S;S, in columns A, B, and C, respectively. (A) is the
situation where there are not conicting intellectual property rights. Col-
umn (B) indicates the eect of rm 1's patent applications on the expected28
payos. These patents can neutralize rm 2's patents and, thus, transform-
ing a duopoly prot into a monopoly prot or a zero prot into a duopoly.
Column (C) adds the eect of rm 2's patent applications which potentially
block rm 1's patents.
Rewriting the payo absent blocking patents
(S;S) =
 N(p1) + p1 |{z}(1   p2)
M + (1   p1)(1   p2)
D + p1p2 |{z}
D + (1   p1) p2 |{z}0
allows to mark the successful R&D activities that may be subject to conict-
ing applications by the competitor. We add the last term equal to zero for
illustrative purpose only because introducing the blocking eect may render
it positive with some probability. This payo function is amended by the
situations where one or both rms are blocking their competitor's patents.
Then the payo is
e (S;S) =  N(p1) + p1(1   p2)

p2
D + (1   )
M




p1(p2D + (1   p2)





e (S;S) =  N(p1) + (S;S)
 p1p2






where (S;S) = p1(1 p2)M +(1 p1)(1 p2)D +p1p2D is the prot of
the reference model wheref both rms choose the short R&D cycle.
Proposition 1 The eect of blocking patents (i) on the number of patent29
applications is negative, (ii) on overall prot is negative if 2p   p2 < 1
and positive otherwise, (iii) on consumer surplus and the probability of a
prisoners' dilemma is inverse to (ii). Thereby p = p1 = p2 is the symmetric
equilibrium of the game (i 2 f1;2g;Ni 2 [0;1[; e (Ni;N i)).
Proof For (i) assume that p2 > pO
2 where pO  pO
2 = pO
1 is the equilibrium
of the benchmark game in Lemma 2 absent blocking eects. The rst order








D)[1   2p1   p2 + p2p2]
 MR: (34)












D)[ 1   ( 1 + 2p2 + 2p1   4p1p2)] < 0 (35)
for p  p1 = p2 (symmetry) and any 0    1. For p2 > pO we have
N0(p1) = MR0 < MR and, thus, p1 < pO. Because of symmetry p1 = p2
which contradicts the assertion p2 > pO.
For (ii), recall that rm i's number of patent applications is determined by
the rst order condition of (33) with respect to pi which is @e (S;S)=@pi = 0.















=  p1p2 [1   p1   p2 + p1p2](
M   2
D) < 0: (37)
which holds in a symmetric equilibria p1 = p2  p for 2p   p2 < 1.
For (iii) note that there are only two states for the provision, namely
duopoly and monopoly. A lower expected payo implies that duopoly be-
comes more probable. Thus welfare increases and lowers the probability of a
prisoners' dilemma because e (S;S) in (24) decreases. 2
The blocking eect of patents decreases the productivity of R&D because
the blocking eect increases the probability that an application becomes obso-
lete. This eect reduces the number of patent applications of the competitor.
However, this latter eect is dominated by the productivity eect. Clark and
Konrad (2006) nd this eect in a model of a contest where a marketable
product builds on multiple, complementary patents. They predict that R&D
eort is reduced in the light of upcoming hold-up situations.
The eect of the blocking property on the rms' overall expected prot
is ambiguous. For small numbers of patent applications, p < 1=2, amplify-
ing the blocking eect will always reduce the rms' prot, i.e. a duopoly
becomes more probable because this will preempt the competitor to achieve
a marketable innovation. An aggravation of the blocking eect when rms
apply for many patents will raise the probability of monopoly prots because
one competitor is more likely to be blocked.
Overall prots and welfare perform in an idiosyncratic way because we
assume that duopoly with new and old products generate the same prots
and welfare. This is a strong assumption because an indenite duopoly with
outdated products would generate the same welfare as an incessant product31
improvement. Raising prices and costs may attenuate this objection. Ac-
tually, in some markets we observe signicant price escalations, for example
in the automobile industry, whereas other industries like semiconductors we
observe quality improvements but approximately constant prices for PCs.
The implications for the probability of a prisoners' dilemma is technically
based on the magnitude of the expected rms' prot in the S;S situation.
Changes in e (S;S) make it more or less attractive to leave the L;L situation.
Thus, a policy that ensures that a pure duopoly arises under the S;S schedule
makes it less attractive to deviate from an L;L situation.
Mutually blocking patents create an incentive to licensing in order to make
the blocked technologies accessible. Licensing helps solving patent thickets
when all parties agree not to litigate against potential infringement. There
are two types of licensing, ex ante licensing and ex post licensing, which dier
by the timing of the licensing agreement relative to the timing of the R&D
investment. For the semi-conductor industry Siebert and von Graevenitz
(2006) nd that most agreements involve ex ante licensing. But there is also
evidence for ex post licensing, i.e. agreements after the parties have built up
patent stocks which have mutually blocking eects (Lerner and Tirole (2004),
Ziedonis (2004)).
Introducing ex ante licensing in the present model setting means that a
rm could not gain an advantage over her competitor and thus, has no incen-
tive to le a costly patent application. Thus, an ex ante licensing agreement
would stabilize long research cycles with low R&D incentives. This gives
rise to antitrust issues because such an agreement may be considered anti-
competitive. Lerner and Tirole (2004) focus on this discussion and provides
conditions under which a patent pool is eciency enhancing. This is even
more the case if patents are complementary assets. We see that transforming
R&D eort into a public good immediately paralyzes R&D. An evaluation32
of ex ante licensing requires a richer modeling of demand in order to assess
the welfare eect of reduced innovative activities.
Under ex post licensing negotiations take place after rms have set up
their patent portfolios. In the present model, this can be interpreted as
incorporating technologies which would have lied idle otherwise. This is
welfare enhancing in the most cases. Still antitrust issues may arise when
cross licensing has a potential to enforce higher marginal cost and higher than
competitive prices on the product market. The U.S. Antitrust Guidelines of
the Licensing of Intellectual Property aim at preventing such behavior.17
Besides antitrust issues, ex post licensing can also distort R&D incentives.
Anticipating hold-up situation may be an additional motive for patenting,
in particular in industries which tend to build up patent thickets (Ziedonis
(2004)). An R&D strategy that aims at creating pure complementarities in
order to secure a share in the competitor's achievement or in order to ob-
tain a better position in subsequent negotiations may induce socially wasteful
eort. Therefore, going for blocking patents instead of dierentiating tech-
nologies constitutes an insurance against being blocked oneself, even if the
blocking patent does not contribute to one own's technology. Even absent
blocking eects of patents Gerlach et al. (2004) analyze the R&D incentives
to go for mainstream or niche products where R&D success is uncertain.
They nd that rms tend to aim more at mainstream products than socially
desirable. Similarly, Cardon and Sasaki (1998) nd that R&D tend to cumu-




The analysis has shown that shorter product cycles can induce more patent-
ing activities. This provides a counter argument to the intuitive reaction of
patenting less when the time is shortened during which the R&D investment
must be recouped or a secret idea may be discovered and replicated. The
underlying mechanism for the more intensive patenting activity is that one
rm may start to patent for exogenous reasons and the optimal reaction of
other rms is then to match this behavior. Otherwise, the extensive patent-
ing of one rm would drive the other rms out of the market or cut their
prots signicantly. In order to prevent this, the other rms will le patent
applications on ideas which may not be mature yet. If this situation occurs
the rms may end up in a prisoners' dilemma where they would jointly prefer
the situation where all rms innovate at moderate pace but each individual
rm has an incentive to deviate to a short cycle with intensive patenting.
Further, network eects may reinforce a rm's incentive to accelerate
her R&D process and to induce other rms to adopt this strategy. Network
eects make it more attractive to gain market shares at an early stage because
an advance compared to the competitors will be persistent. Therefore, the
model predicts an intensive race by means of patent applications followed by
a period of weakened innovative activities.
Similarly, blocking patents provide an advantage over competitors by lim-
iting their access to technologies. But, in contrast to network eects, this is
socially harmful because some R&D eort is wasted. Therefore, rms will
patent less because their R&D tends to be less ecient. Also, a monopoly
position becomes less probable if the blocking eect is strong.
Welfare implications are restricted to the pace of technological develop-
ment because the modeling of demand behavior limits further interpretation34
of consumer welfare. There is an immediate welfare loss from the block-
ing eect which inhibits patented technologies from being incorporated in
marketed products. Moreover, over time patents and patent applications
accumulate and the delayed publication 18 months after rst ling creates
uncertainty. This may create a patent thicket. Once this occurs, this may de-
ter active rms from further research or potential entrants from engaging in
this technology. The uncertainty is even increased when rms apply through
the WIPO where an applicant can delay its decision to seek for protection for
up to 18 further months compared to the procedure through national patent
oces.
In the present model we do not tackle the question about the optimal
amount of innovation. Usually, it is assumed that more innovation is better
than less. Then a policy which promotes more innovation is benecial. On
the level of the patent examination process a blocking patent cannot be
identied because the blocking property becomes relevant when the patent
technology is used in a product. Therefore, licensing as an instrument to
solve up blocking eects should be facilitated. This holds in particular for
technology areas where patent thickets emerge.35
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